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    Following Schumpeter we assume that innovation in specific 
firms, or groups of firms, can have economy-wide effects. Models based on this 
idea can be shown to have multiple equilibria. The idea of a positive feedback 
loop innovation system or POLIS is formalized by picking an appropriate 
sequence of equilibria over time. It is shown that POLIS has empirical 
relevance by applying the formal model to an actual economy. The 1997-98 
financial crisis in many Asian countries, most notably South Korea, seemed to 
have reversed the conventional wisdom regarding the East Asian miracle”. This 
paper applies the concept of a POLIS to the case of Taiwan to show that at 
least in this case, 
 neither the  view that the miracle was a mirage nor the  view that the growth 
was a result of factor accumulation only is correct. Ultimately technological 
transformation  — in particular the creation of a positive feedback loop 
innovation system is what makes the difference between sustained growth and 
gradual or sudden decline. Although various problems remain in both the real 
and the financial sectors, the successes of Taiwan in building the preconditions 
for an innovation system are worth examining. Upon careful examination of 
Taiwan’s system of innovation within the above Schumpeterian model it is 
found that   Taiwan has a fighting chance of building a POLIS in the near future. 
An interesting feature of the Taiwan POLIS is the modular organizational 
architecture of some of the high technology firms in Hsinchu science-based 
industrial park and other centers. 
   2
1.  Introduction 
 
 
    How can we evaluate the industrialization experience of East 
Asian economies like Taiwan from a long-term growth perspective? Many have 
questioned the role of technical progress in these countries. Lau and his 
co-authors as well as Young in particular have been unable to find any role for 
technical progress in explaining the growth rate. Is this really the case for an 
economy like Taiwan? The answer to this question, it will be seen, depends at 
least partly on methodology. In this paper an economy-wide modeling approach 
consistent with Schumpeter’s emphasis on creative destruction is followed. It 
turns out that this allows one to examine aspects of the relations between 
growth and innovation that the aggregate meta-production function approach 
and the standard growth accounting procedures fail to observe directly at an 
appropriate level of dissagregation. 
 
    In Capitalism, Socialism, Democracy Schumpeter characterized 
creative destruction in the following way: 
 
The fundamental impulse that sets and keeps the capitalist 
engine in motion comes from the new consumers’ goods, the new 
methods of production or transportation, the new markets,....  
(This process) incessantly revolutionizes the economic structure 
from within,  incessantly destroying the old one, incessantly 
creating a new one. This process of Creative Destruction is the 
essential fact about capitalism.
1 
 
   
    The essence of capitalism in this view, is the constant 
revolutionizing of the economic structure from within. Marx had made a similar 
observation about the endogenous nature of technical change (Marx, 1867,   3
1946). Aghion and Howitt (1992) have proposed a model of creative destruction 
by treating the innovation process as a rivalry following the patent-race 
literature. Iwai (1984a,b; 1991;200;2001) explores the dynamics of 
Scumpeterian models in a variety of ways. A macroeconomic model of growth, 
consistent with innovations at the micro-level through productive investments, 
was presented in Scott (1989)--- particularly in chapters 5 to 9--- with much 
necessary detail and patient elaboration. The present work is very much in that 
spirit, with the focus being more explicitly on a disaggregated”micro-structure” 
at the sectoral and groups of firm level. Theoretically, both firms and groups of 
firms can engage in innovation with potential macroeconomic impact; but 
empirically, for Taiwan the focus here will be on groups of firms in specific 
sectors. 
   
    The present paper assumes following Schumpeter, Scott, and 
Aghion and Howitt, that innovation in specific firms, or groups of firms  can have 
economy-wide effects. The expected growth rate of the economy depends, 
among other things, on the economy-wide amount of research
2; but the 
process of this growth, precisely because research leads to the development of 
new products and processes, is characterized by creative destruction.  
 
    The relationship between R&D and growth is therefore both 
intimate and complex. An economy-wide model i ntending to capture this 
complex relationship will need to posit non-linearities and complex feedback 
                                                                                                                                                                              
1   Schumpeter (1942) p. 83 
2 Not just research, but other factors such as overall investment, complementary human capital formation 
etc. are also important. In the multisectoral model of POLIS considered later, both R&D and other factors 
can be included in principle. However, R&D in a broad sense is still a necessary condition for innovation 
that can have economy-wide impact. But historically, there are stages where, as in Taiwan, an economy 
begins with very little R&D, goes through output expansion in an export promotion regime, and then   4
rules. In this paper, an attempt in this direction is made by endowing production 
functions and correspondences with some of these features. In particular, by 
defining non-linear production structures so that increasing returns and 
endogenous innovations are possible one can explore the properties of fixed 
points that define equilibria at any point in time. A sequence of such equilibria 
over time, picked by an appropriate selection procedure, can then show the 
evolution of the system. 
3 
 
    Section 2 presents the idea of technological complexity and two 
relevant models motivated by this discussion. The existence and 
characterization of multiple equilibria show the possibility of creating a positive 
feedback loop innovation system (POLIS) in a model economy on an abstract 
function space. Section 3 is an initial attempt to apply the abstract theorems to a 
real world economy through a series of linear approximations. The economy 
chosen for this purpose is that of Taiwan. As mentioned before, recent 
controversy between contending perspectives on technological change makes 
Taiwan an interesting case. Potentially, a modeling approach embodying 
POLIS offers an alternative to the standard growth accounting approach to 
assessing the presence and impact of technical change. The results presented 
here are preliminary but promising enough to establish the empirical relevance 
of the alternative models of growth through creative destruction. 
                                                                                                                                                                              
gradually begins imitative and innovative R&D processes. I am grateful to an anonymous referee for 
suggesting clarifications  regarding the complex relationship between  R&D and growth. 
3 One interesting aspect in proceeding as I do in showing the theoretical possibility of  constructing a 
temporal sequence of equilibria(fixed points) is that it not only preserves the spirit of Kaldor’s critique of 
neoclassical equilibrium analysis, but also allows for increasing returns to play the kind of central role 
that Kaldor had intended. At the same time, it eschews the problems of a full-fledged disequilibrium 
analysis which can become intractable very quickly in the context of a complex, multi-sectoral economic 
model. For an evolution of Kaldor’s own thinking on these and related issue see the theoretical essays in 
Kaldor(1978).   5
    Thus, this paper attempts to offer a new perspective on the 
productivity debate in East Asia by going beyond the growth accounting or 
production function fitting approaches used by the participants. It can be seen 
as belonging to attempts, most notably by Nelson and Pack (1996), to eschew 
the conceptual problems arising from the standard methodologies. It also 
begins from the idea that while technology is the key issue, for judging 
performances of entire economies we should begin with consideration of 
systems of technologies (James and Khan, 1997; Stewart 1977) and ask 
ourselves how modern systems of technology can replace more traditional 
systems during the process of development. We should then ask ourselves if 
East Asian economies such as Taiwan have in fact made this transition. This 
paper argues that indeed a transition has been made by Taiwan in a limited but 
analytically and empirically relevant fashion and goes further in investigating 
how permanent this transition is likely to be. In this sense also, the approach 
and conclusions are consistent with what Nelson and Pack call the 
assimilationist interpretation of the East Asian growth. 
 
2.   Technological Complexity and Models of POLIS 
 
2.A.  Technological Systems as Complex Structures 
 
    As the debate on the “East Asian miracle” underlines, the key 
strategic question for a country that has made a technological transition from a 
traditional to a modern system concerns the prospects for long-term economic 
growth.  Ultimately, it is the sustainable long-term rate of growth that will   6
determine the wealth that can be distributed among personal consumption, 
investment, government spending on infrastructure and public services, etc.
4 
 
    Therefore, it is the creation of an innovation system that will 
determine the viability of a technology-based growth process. This process of 
building an innovation system is very much an evolutionary and 
path-dependent process.(Nelson 1981, 1989, 1993, 1994; Nelson and Winter 
1974, 1977, 1982) The central idea is that the provision of appropriate types of 
capital, labor and forms of organization for high value-added industries will lead 
to rapid productivity increases.
5  However, to sustain such an increase, a 
domestic innovation system must be set up. There is a further requirement that 
this innovation system must fulfill. This is the requirement of a positive feedback 
loop or a virtuous cycle of innovations. 
 
    This problem, as we will see soon, is intimately connected with the 
existence of multiple equilibria in complex economies. A positive feedback loop 
leading to a virtuous cycle of growth and technology development is one 
particular sequence of equilibria in this context. In general, such a sequence also 
involves increasing returns. In the remainder of this  section a theoretical 
exploration of innovation with increasing returns and multiple equilibria will be 
undertaken. 
 
    In a market economy, success is often cumulative or 
self-reinforcing.  Typically outcomes are not predictable in advance.  However, 
                                                             
4 The role of government, in general, is both important and complex. Simple etatist or, at the other 
extreme, the neoliberal doctrines  can be misleading. For a nuanced and detailed empirical investigation 
at the institutional level for Taiwan see Wade(1990) 
5           In this context, especially with respect to the building up of technological capabilities Lall has 
been a   pioneer. See Lall (2001) for  an up-to-date discussion.   7
once an equilibrium gets selected out of a number of long-run equilibria, there is a 
tendency to be locked in.  Technically, economic processes exhibit 
non-convexities  -- violating the generic assumption of competitive equilibrium 
economics. The presence of self-reinforcing mechanisms sharing common 
features found in fields as far apart as enzyme reactions and the economics of 
technical change underlines the importance of such mechanisms in governing 
the dynamics of self-reinforcing processes regardless of the field in which they 
occur. 
 
2.B.   A ‘Simple’ Non-linear Model of Complexity
6 
   
    In order to give the reader some idea of the problem of formalizing 
complex technological systems I summarize here the basic structure of 
a ’simple’ non-linear model embodying distinct technological systems. At any 
single point in time, the model can be presented as a Social Accounting Matrix 
(SAM) representation of the socio-economic system. The key distinction here is 
the explicitly non-linear nature of the economy-wide functional relationships. 
The key theorem shows the existence of multiple equilibria. Some further 
considerations of complexity and increasing returns show that multiple 
equilibria are indeed the natural outcomes in such models. Thus, there would 
seem to be some role for domestic policy in guiding the economy to a particular 
equilibrium among many. 
 
    The virtue of an economy-wide approach to technology systems 
is the embodiment of various inter-sectoral linkages. In a SAM, such linkages 
                                                             
6   Khan (1997c and forthcoming, 1998) contains technical discussion and proofs of 
Existence of multiple equilibria for an entire class of models of this type. 
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are mappings from one set of accounts to another. In terms of technology 
systems, the production activities can be broken down into a production (sub-) 
system and a set of innovative activities. In practice, this presents considerable 
difficulties of classification and empirical estimation. 
 
    One major component of the entire innovation system is, of 
course, the expenditures on R&D. In the SAM for Taiwan used here, this can 
appear either as an aggregate expenditure along the column labeled R&D, or 
as a set of disaggregated expenditures.
7  In the latter case these may be 
specified according to productive activities (e.g., construction, electrical 
equipment, etc.) or by institutions (e.g., private R&D expenditures, government 
R&D expenditures, etc.).  It should be emphasized that the dynamic effects of 
R&D on the economy can be captured only in a series of such SAMs over time. 
This approach is still at the conceptual stage, but appears to be quite appealing. 
One can contrast the possible policy experiments that can be undertaken within 
such a framework with the apparently ad hoc science and technology policies in 
many developing countries. In particular, the impact over time of a POLIS can 
be traced by building and maintaining such SAMs. 
 
    Choice of new technology in a developing country is affected by 
research and development in at least three different ways. Such a country can 
attempt to develop new technology through R&D, as mentioned previously.  
This ultimately requires a positive feedback loop innovation system in order to 
                                                             
7   Both types of specifications are possible in principle. In practice, as in the case of South 
South Korea (Khan 1998), the availability of data will often determine what type of 
specification will be used. 
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be self-sustaining. Another alternative is to adapt existing technology. This too 
requires a production system geared towards innovation in a limited way. A 
third alternative is to import technology or to acquire it through attracting foreign 
direct investment. In practice, all these different forms may be combined. The 
abstract model embodies all these different possibilities. However, the first 
option requires, among other things, a presence of multiple equilibria.
8 In a 
unique equilibrium world the competitive equilibrium (under the assumption of 
complete markets) will always be the most efficient one. The presence of 
increasing returns usually destroys such competitive conditions.  
 
    We begin with a number of productive activities reflecting the 
existing technological structure. This activities are defined on the input-output  
subspace of the general and abstract mathematical space X. In addition to the 
values of inputs and outputs, points in this space could also represent 
household and other institutional income and expenditure accounts. We also 
incorporate the possibility of R&D as a separate productive activity. Formally, it 
is always possible to break R&D down into as many finite components as we 
want. The key relationship in this context is that between the endogenous 
accounts (usually, production activities and technologies, factors and 
households) and the exogenous ones.  It is this relationship that is posited to be 
non-linear and this together with some assumptions on the relevant 
mathematical space can lead to the existence of multiple equilibria. 
    Although the existence theorems for these multisectoral models 
provide some structure for the equilibria as sequences of fixed points in the 
socio-economic structure with evolving technology systems, it is not specified a 
                                                             
8   This could be considered  a modern mathematical representation of Schumpeter’s idea that    10
priori which equilibrium will be reached. The problem of equilibrium selection 
thus remains open. The idea behind a POLIS can now be stated somewhat 
more formally. It is to reach a sequence of equilibria so that in the non-linear 
models of the entire economy the maximal fixed points that are attainable are in 
fact reached through a combination of market forces and policy maneuvers 
over time. It is also to be understood that path-dependence of technology would 
rule out certain equilibria in the future. Thus initial choices of technologies can 
matter crucially at times. 
 
2. C.   The Model on a Lattice 
 
           Define X as a vector lattice over a subring M of the real field R. 
Let X+ = { X‰X ˛ X, x ‡ 0} 
A non-linear mapping N is defined s.t. N: X+  ﬁ X+ , NO = 0.  Given a vector of 
exogenous variables d, the following non-linear mapping describes a 
simultaneous non-linear equations model of an economy, E: 
x = Nx + d                (1) 
for a given d  ˛ X+. 
This non-linear system represents a socio-economic system of the type 
described previously.  In order to specify the model further, the following 
assumptions are necessary.   
1.  X is order complete 
2.  N is an isotone mapping 
3. ￿$ x ˛ S. t.  $ x‡ N$ x+ d 
                                                                                                                                                                              
perfectly competitive firms were singularly unmotivated to innovate. 
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In terms of the economics of the model, the non-linear mapping from the space 
of inputs to the space of the outputs allows for non-constant returns to scale 
and technical progress over time. The 3 assumptions are minimally necessary 
for the existence of an equilibrium. Assumption 3, in particular  ensures that 
there is some level of output vector which can be produced given the technical 
production conditions and demand structure. 
 
Existence of Multiple Equilibria: 
Theorem: Under the assumptions 1 - 3, there exists x* ˛ X+  so that x* is a 
solution of  
x =  Nx + d 
 Proof: Consider the interval maps [0, x ] = {$ x‰$ x˛ X+, 0 £ $ x £  x } where $ x is 
defined as in assumption 3.  Take a mapping F. 
F: x ˛ X+ ﬁNx + d 
F is isotone and maps [0, x ] into itself. 
Define a set  D ” {x‰x˛ [0, x ], x ‡ Fx }.  
By assumption 3, D is non-empty. 
We now show x* ” inf D is a solution to x = Nx + d.  x* ” inf D; therefore x* £ x, 
"x  ˛ D.  F is isotone; therefore Fx* £ Fx £ x for each x ˛ D implying. 
  Fx* £ x* 
From (2) we have F(Fx*) £ Fx*.  Thus Fx* ˛ D; hence x* = inf D £ Fx* so, Fx* £ 
x* £ Fx*.  Therefore x* = Fx*. 
This is an application of Tarski and Birkhoff theorem.  The key feature to note 
here is that the equilibrium is not necessarily unique.  It should also be noted 
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computation of a fixed point can be done by standard methods (e.g. Ortega and 
Rheinboldt). 
 
2.D.   Multiple Equilibria on Banach Space:   
 
  In this section the results for multiple equilibria are extended to 
functionals on Banach Space. We can define the model again for monotone 
iterations, this time on a non-empty subset of an ordered Banach space X. 
The mapping f: X ﬁX is called  compact if it is continuous and if f(x) is 
relatively compact.  The map f is called  completely continuous if f is 
continuous and maps bounded subsets of X into compact sets.  Let X be a 
non-empty subset of some ordered set Y.  A fixed point x of a map N: XﬁX 
is called minimal (maximal) if every fixed point y of N in X satisfies 
 x £ y (y £ x). 
Theorem: Let (E,P) be an ordered Banach space and let D be a subset of E.   
Suppose that f: DﬁE is an increasing map which is compact on every order 
interval in D.  If there exists ‘y, y ˛ D with ‘y £ y s.t. ‘y £ f (y) and f(‘y ) £ y, then 
f has a minimal fixed point x.  Moreover,  x £ y and  x = lim F
k (y).  That is, the 
minimal fixed point can be computed iteratively by means of the iteration 
scheme   
x0 = y 
xk+1 = f (xk)    k = 0, 1, 2, ... 
Moreover, the sequence (xk) is increasing. 
Proof: Since ƒ is increasing, the hypotheses imply that ƒ maps the order interval 
[‘y, y] into itself.  Consequently, the sequence (xk) is well-defined and, since it is 
contained in ƒ[‘y,y], it is relatively compact.  Hence it has at least one limit point.  
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By induction, it is easily seen that the sequence (xk) is increasing.  This implies 
that it has exactly one limit point ‘x and that the whole sequence converges to 
‘x.  Since ƒ is continuous, ‘x is a fixed point of ƒ.  If x is an arbitrary fixed point 
in D such that x ‡‘y, then, by replacing y by x in the above argument, it follows 
that ‘x £ x.  Hence ‘x is the minimal fixed point of ƒ in (‘y + P) ˙ D.  It should be 
observed that we do not claim that there exists a minimal fixed point of ƒ in D. 
We can also show that if F: x ˛ X+ ﬁ Nx +d is an intersecting compact 
map in a non-empty order interval   [x,  $ x ] and  x £  F $ x  and Fx £  x then F has a 
minimal fixed point x* and a maximal fixed point x**.  Moreover, x* = lim F
k ( x ) 
and x** = lim F
k ( x ). The first of the above sequences is increasing and the 
second is decreasing. 
 
2.E.  Translating the Non-linear Model 
   
    These models, interpreted with due caution, demonstrate the 
theoretical possibility for a (Schumpeterian) positive feedback loop innovation 
system. However, it is far from transparent how such a system can be 
represented in actuality.  In the next section, an attempt will be made to first define 
precisely what technological systems are from an empirical standpoint for a 
specific NIE such as South Korea or Taiwan. Based on this, an operational way of 
capturing such systems empirically will be presented. The vehicle chosen for 
such a representation is the Social Accounting Matrix or SAM. SAMs are 
elaborate quantitative constructions based on social and economic data that can 
show the economy at a point in time with the necessary detail. How do we depict 
different technology systems in a SAM?  How can we show the evolution of a 
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technology system in such a construction? How do we incorporate R&D and 
other factors of significance in understanding innovation in a SAM? These are 
some of the questions we need to raise. At the end, through a series of 
approximations the non-linearities and complexities of an innovation system can 
be approached meaningfully by using empirical SAMs for particular countries.
9 
 
3.  Taiwan: Building a POLIS 
 
 
    In this section an East Asian “miracle” country--Taiwan--is studied 
with the help of the Schumpeterian model developed above. The history of 
development of Taiwan shows a greater reliance on direct foreign investment,  
more direct government ownership of enterprises and the greater role of small 
and medium enterprises in the manufacturing sector than the other large East 
Asian ”miracle” economy, South Korea. 
 
    The early development policy in Taiwan was aimed at increasing 
agricultural output and developing an infrastructure. Light manufacturing 
industries were also promoted. Import-substitution policy was pursued till the 
mid-sixties. U.S. foreign aid played a crucial role in financing imports and early 
capital formation. 
 
    The switch to a regime of export promotion took place in the 
mid-sixties, as in the case of South Korea. Initially exports of the light 
manufacturing industries such as textiles and consumer electronics were 
                                                             
9   Khan (1997c, and 1998) offers a technical description of the exact empirical methods 
and computational details.   15
stimulated. At the same time, Taiwan pursued a long-term strategy of building a 
more complex industrial structure including steel, petrochemicals, machine 
tools and electronic equipment. 
 
    The new outward-looking strategy was accompanied by a series 
of financial and fiscal measures to facilitate export financing and to help 
establish export processing zones.  From the beginning, Taiwan made a 
special effort to promote high technology sectors through publicly funded 
research laboratories.
10  Later, an industrial park was created specifically for 
high technology industries. 
 
    In the wake of the 1973 oil crisis a policy of major infrastructure 
projects was introduced. Subsequently, capital goods producing sectors were 
promoted heavily.  As a result Taiwan broadened its export base to include 
machinery and related equipment. 
 
    The second oil shock also led to substantial changes in Taiwan’s 
industrial policies. Overcapacity and the lack of competitiveness in a number of 
firms were addressed by a strategy of scaling-down industrialization plans.  
Strategically selected firms, however, were aided by special grants and loans.  
Foreign investment in capital-intensive sectors was encouraged further in order 
to effect a transfer of technology and knowledge. 
 
                                                             
10 Ofcourse, this ‘government laboratory view’ of Taiwan’s technological capability should not be 
overdone. Many pioneering firms, as discussed shortly, acquired their technology through 
sub-contracting, joint ventures, licensing etc.. Government programmes seem to have been valuable only 
in selected areas of R&D. But even that is no mean achievement.   16
    The new orientation in the 1980s has meant an emphasis on high 
technology and skill-intensive activities.  Specifically, three areas--information, 
electronics, and machinery--were identified as strategic. Precision instruments, 
machine tools, VCRs, telecommunications equipment and computers are 
products that were targeted for special treatment (Liu 1993). 
 
    Inspite of the openness, flexibility and strategic vision of the 
Taiwanese economy there may be problems in creating a POLIS. The 
predominance of small firms may be a handicap where large R&D expenditures 
may be necessary for high-tech ventures. The strategic complementarity of 
R&D and skilled human components may also create a bottleneck in some 
sectors. Thus, whether Taiwan has succeeded in creating a POLIS is an open 
and non-trivial question.  However, there is one particular sector in which 
Taiwan may have achieved a mature capability to innovate. This is the 
electronics sector. A discussion of the state of the electronics sector can serve 
as a prelude to a discussion of an economy- wide capability to innovate.
11 
 
The Electronics Sector in Taiwan 
    From a humble beginning in the 1950s--when Taiwan first started 
producing transistor radios--to the 1990s, the electronics sector has grown to 
include many advanced products. Among them are the various components of 
personal computers, advanced work stations and other microelectronic 
products.  Companies such as Tatung and ACER have sales exceeding one 
                                                             
11   Of course, it is not being claimed that having an apparently self-sustaining innovation 
structure in one sector is sufficient for a POLIS.  For this we must examine the 
economy-wide linkages. 
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billion dollars.  A number of small firms such as Sampo Corporation and United 
Microelectronic Corporation have shown tremendous growth in recent years. 
The share of foreign-owned firms also declined during the 1980s and 90s. 
However, even now the foreign-owned firms account for more than 25 percent 
of the industry output. 
 
    Small- and medium-sized firms (defined as firms with less than 
300 employees) dominate the industry. This means that unlike South Korea the 
innovation occurs in relatively small firms. Modifications that take this fact into 
account are therefore necessary in building a SAM-Tech for Taiwan as is 
shown in the following section.   
 
    Table 1 shows the plans for the year 2000 for the electronics 
industry.  Information products are forecast to be the leading edge in the 
industry.  According to O’Connor and Wang (1992) nearly US$ 6 billion of total 
computer production was exported. Of this 40 percent went to North America 
and 41 percent to Europe. Japan imported only 2 percent of the computer 
exports; but Asia-Pacific accounted for about 14 percent. 
 
Table 1:  Electronics and information technology, production values and 
                 forecasts (US$ billions) 
 
 
        Output    Revised growth rate    
                    1990                  forecast     2005  (%) 
 Information products            6.9        3.2 
 Automation                           2.8                     5.1 
 Consumer electronics           2.3                 3.2 
 Telecommunications            1.9                    4.6 
 Semiconductors                   1.5                      6.2 
 Total                                     15.4                   22.3 
 
(Source: Hobday, 100, My calculation for growth rate for 2005 )   18
    Although the take-off in the electronics sector appears to be a 
market phenomenon government policies also played a role. In May 1979, the 
Executive Yuan put forth the Science and Technology Development Program. 
This program identified information technology systems as an area of emphasis 
for future R&D.  The idea for establishing the Institute for Information Industry 
was also hatched during this period. 
 
    The Ministry of Economic Affairs moved quickly. In July 1979, the 
implementation plan for computer technology was contracted out to the 
Industrial Technology Research Institute. The Council for Economic Planning 
and Development prepared a ten-year plan, 1980-1989. The plan  provided 
targets for R&D expenditures and human capital supply among other things. 
The Electronics Research Services Organization was given responsibility for 
coordinating the transfer of technology from foreign companies. 
 
    By all indicators the ambitious plans succeeded for the most part. 
By the 1990s Taiwanese firms took their place among innovative designers of 
PCs, electronic notebooks, and circuit boards. Many new companies such as 
Datatech were started in the 1980s. Several of them (including Datatech) grew 
to be successful.  During this time Taiwan also surpassed Great Britain to 
become the fifth largest producer of semiconductors in the world. The major 
industrial policy pursued by Taiwan was directed credit from the formal lending 
institutions to the large and growing firms in this sector. 
   19
    Under an overall imitative strategy (Chiang, 1990) Taiwan 
decided to follow the leaders in already established technologies. The objective 
has been to compete by cutting costs through productive efficiency. The 
government has taken the responsibility for acquiring technology from abroad. 
It has also fostered advanced research. The government-supported research 
institutes, utilizing skilled scientists and engineers, have been crucial for 
carrying on such research.  The results of the research are then transferred to 
the private sector. 
 
    Furthermore, economic incentives are provided to the strategic 
sectors through favorable tax and credit policies. In terms of complementary 
human capital accumulation, many Taiwanese went abroad and continue to do 
so in order to acquire advanced education and skills in science and technology. 
A number of local employees were also trained in the foreign multinationals 
where they were employed as engineers, technicians and managers. Lucrative 
financial incentives were offered to attract skilled Taiwanese living abroad. 
 
    As Hobday (1995) points out, there seem to be a least five types 
of strategic firms in the electronics industry. These are: foreign corporations 
and joint ventures; the major local manufacturing groups; high technology 
start-up firms; government-sponsored ventures; and the traditional small and 
medium enterprises that cluster together in special market niches. The 
combined effect of strategic interactions among these actors has been the rapid 
growth and expansion in the industry as a whole even when some individual   20
firms have declined.  There is an almost classic Schumpeterian scenario 
unfolding before our very eyes in this sector. 
 
    It may not be out of place to discuss the role of the major private 
manufacturing groups and government-sponsored start-ups here. Both 
Chapponniere and Fouquin (1989) and Hobday (1995) have discussed the 
activities of these actors in Taiwan.  The following brief discussion highlights the 
actions of these diverse economic agents in creating the conditions for 
a ”POLIS” at least within the electronics sector. 
 
The Electronics Sector: Firms 
    The progress of Tatung in the development of their electronics 
industry, according to Hobday,  is representative of the entire electronics 
industry in Taiwan. In the 1970s, electronics became the industrial group’s 
largest operation. The following table 2 shows Tatung’s progress in electronics. 
The electronics maker began to produce black and white TVs by 1964 and 
fourteen-inch color monitors for computers by the early 1990s. The company 
also currently produces other household electronics and electric goods in its 
manufacturing plants around the world.   21
Table 2: Tatung’s Progress in Electronics: Towards the Construction of 
POLIS 
  
  Product                                                                      Introduction date 
   Black and white TVs             1964 
   Colour TVs              1969 
   Black and white TV picture tubes                       1980 
   VCRs                1982 
   High resolution colour TV picture tubes          1982 
   Colour TV tubes                               mid-1980s 
   PCs                     mid-1980s 
   Hard disk drives                               mid-1980s 
   TV chips/ASICs                     late 1980s 
   Sun workstation clones                         1989 




  Tatung, like the typical South Korean  chaebol, first gained its 
manufacturing knowledge through technical cooperation deals. By investing 
capital in joint venture projects with foreign companies the Tatung group gained 
further through licensing agreements while learning technological skills through 
OEM deals.  Tatung absorbed and adapted foreign technology, learning to 
modify, re-engineer and re-design consumer goods to fit customer n eeds. 
While production initially involved little R&D, the group did employ more than 
500 R&D staff by 1990. However, the job of this mainly engineering staff was in 
advanced engineering rather than “blue sky research.” Finally, just as 
production technology has been passed to industries in Taiwan by the more 
advanced manufacturing nations, by the mid-1980s Tatung was transferring its 
production technologies to its subsidiaries in lower cost East Asian countries. 
 
  ACER is representative of the high technology start-up 
companies which began to appear in Taiwan in the late 1970s and early 1980s.  
ACER relied on product innovation and original equipment manufacturing 
(OEM) with experience gained by individuals who had worked overseas in US   22
firms or universities. Many of the other recent start-ups, like ACER, have used 
OEM to some extent, and most were unknown outside of Asia despite brand 
name sales. The following table 3 shows the development and innovations of 
ACER. 
 
Table 3:  ACER-Behind the Frontier Innovations:Towards A POLIS 
 
 1984     developed its own version of the 4 bit microcomputer (later followed by 8 bit, 
      16 bit and 32 bit PCs) 
 1986    launched the world second 32 bit PC, after Compaq but ahead of IBM 
 1988    began developing supercomputer technology using the Unix operation 
system 
 1989    produced its own semiconductor ASIC to compete with IBM PS/2 technology 
 1991    formed a joint company with TI (and the Taiwanese Government) to make 
                memory chips (DRAMs) in Taiwan 
 1992    formed alliances with Daimler Benz and Smith Corona to develop specialist 
      microelectronics technology 
 1993    produced a novel PC using a reduced instruction-set (RISC) chip running 
      Microsoft Windows NT operating system 
 1993    licensed its own US-patented ChipUp technology to Intel (in return for  
       royalties) 
 1993    received royalties from National Semiconductor, TI, Unisys, NEC and other 




    ACER, according to many observers of technology in Taiwan, 
exemplifies many of the strengths and weaknesses of Taiwan’s high 
technology start-ups. ACER started with only 11 engineers in 1976 with total 
sales reaching some US$1.4 billion by 1993.  ACER led the local computer 
industry in the 1980s with 60 percent of sales being name brand through OBM. 
The company began to distribute directly to customers abroad during this 
period in order to challenge other brand leaders and move beyond OEM. 
However, the company began to retreat from OBM to OEM and ODM sales 
after heavy losses between 1990 and 1993.   
   23
    The above discussion shows that there are strengths or 
advantages and weaknesses or disadvantages of companies like ACER. The 
strengths or advantages of these companies have been that they were able to 
benefit tremendously from the improving technological infrastructure and 
established market channels; they were able to bypass the consumer 
electronics phase of the 1970s thus allowing them to enter the market at a 
higher technology level, and they have received greater benefits from 
managers and engineers educated abroad. The weaknesses or disadvantages 
for these companies has been mainly the difficulty they have encountered as 
latecomers. Specifically in the ACER case, the company sustained heavy 
losses in own-brand sales. This forced the company to move from OBM back to 
OEM, once again making ACER dependent on the global leaders of core 
technologies. Unless and until these latecomers make the full transition to OBM 
and develop in-house technologies, they w ill be dependent on the global 
leaders and unable to compete on an equal basis. 
 
    The final grouping to be discussed here is the 
government-sponsored start-ups. The following table 4 shows the companies 
working at the government-developed Hsinchu facility and their relationship 
with international companies. 
12 
 
                                                             
12 While I agree with Saxenian(1994;2000) regarding both conglomeration and network of relations in 
creating “regional advantage”, the Taiwan case is more complex than just accumulating private sector 
agglomeration economies. My interviews at Hscinchu and other locations with firm managers and at 
other times and locations with the relevant government officials point to a complex interaction between 
the proivate sector and the government in high technology sectors in Taiwan.   24
Table 4: High-technology Start-ups in Hsinchu Science-Based Industrial Park 
(Government/firm/market interaction towards a POLIS) 
 
 Firm        Start  Sector         Sources of senior staff, 
        date            technology and training 
 Microelectronics    1983  Telecom         HP, Harris, TRW 
    Technology Inc. 
 United Fibre Optics                 Sumitomo (J), Philips (H) 
    Communications Inc.  1986  Telecom         AT&T, STC (UK) 
 TECOM      1980  Telecom         Bell Labs, IBM 
 Macronix      1989  Semiconductors     Intel, VLSI-Tech 
 Winbond       
     Electronics Corp    1987  Semiconductors     RCA, HP 
 Taiwan Semiconductor  1987  Semiconductor       Harris, Burrows, 
    Manufacturing Corp.                       foundry                 RCS, Philips (H), IBM 
 
(Source: Hobday, 118; verified by the author during a visit to the Hsinchu facilities in 1998)) 
 
  In one case of government-sponsored start-ups, the government 
has taken a ”hands on” approach offering direct and indirect assistance, to 
include tax incentives and loans, and the use of science park facilities at 
Hsinchu to entice overseas Taiwanese to return to Taiwan.  MTI, a 
telecommunications equipment maker, is one example.  The government was 
greatly responsible for initiating this firm.   
 
    In another example, the Winbond Electronics Corporation, the 
government arranged for technology transfers for Winbond. Winbond founder 
and eventually many of its employees came from the Industrial Technology 
Research Institute, a state controlled organization that trained engineers in 
advanced semiconductors and transferred technology. The company took 
advantage of the needs and demands for technology in the local market. With 
technological transfers and innovation, Winbond was able to compete in a 
number of areas not only locally but internationally as well.  However, shortages 
in investment capital, poor brand name recognition, and uncertain distribution   25
arrangements meant that the company remained dependent on international 
leaders for technological innovation and capital goods.      
 
    A final example of a government-sponsored start-up is United 
Fibre Optic Communications Inc (UFOC). The government, specifically the 
Ministry of Economic Affairs Industrial Development Bureau, felt that Taiwan 
needed an indigenous fibre optic producer. This government agency called 
together the four largest copper producers and the local telecommunications 
operator within Taiwan to form a joint venture company, UFOC. The new 
venture attempted to obtain licensing agreements with four other international 
companies, finally deciding on one of them, AT&T.     
   
  UFOC is representative of the other start-up companies in 
Taiwan.  Faced with the option of continuing to purchase its know-how from 
international competitors or investing heavily in its own in-house technology 
these companies have usually had to rely on the former for continued learning 
and technology. This suggests some of the difficulties of latecomers in 
overcoming the OEM path to further development  (Hobday, 1995). 
Nevertheless, innovation can be carried out with support from the state. 
 
But, Does Taiwan have a POLIS? 
    The foregoing discussion leads to the conclusion that at least in 
the electronics sector the Taiwanese firms have become innovators o n an 
ongoing basis.  It may even be said that there is a localized “POLIS” in the 
sector, as it were.  But are the linkages with the rest of the economy sound   26
enough to generate an overall “POLIS” effect?  Are the R&D activities 
elsewhere in the economy being stimulated in such a way that an ongoing 
economy-wide positive feedback loop leading to a virtuous cycle of innovation 
and growth can be said to exist? 
 
    Let us recall that both Lau and Kim and Young separately arrived 
at the conclusion that for Taiwan also, in terms of total factor productivity growth 
the macroevidence does not support the hypothesis growth through technical 
change. In the terminology developed here those findings may be read as a 
rejection of the hypothesis that a POLIS exists in Taiwan at present. 
    As in section III, the approach followed here is to construct two 
successive SAM-Techs with the modern high-tech sectors included. The same 
approximation strategy used previously can once again be utilized in order to 
apply the insights o f the non-linear theoretical model of POLIS to the 
Taiwanese case.  The years used are 1990 and 1992.  The intention here is to 
capture the structural change in the modern technology system as completely 
as possible.   
    The production, household and factors in Taiwan all have 
somewhat different classifications from those of South Korea
13.  This is 
inevitable in a study of comparative economic structures in two different 
countries. In both the SAMs, however, R&D could be included as a separate 
activity. Classifications of factors (fewer in numbers in Taiwan) in both cases 
                                                             
13 For the South Korean SAMs please see Khan (1997a) and particularly chapter 5 in Khan(1998). The 
household and factor classifications are deliberately kept simple and similar to the Korean SAM-Tech. 
Thus the focus is on productivity and technical change, and only incidentally on consumption and 
distribution. If the focus changes from production to these other aspects then more detailed household 
and labor and capital classification may be necessary.   27
includes a separate category for engineers, technical and professional 
personnel. The total number of households in Taiwan is ten.  On the production 
side the activities have been disaggregated more for the non-agricultural 
sectors. A separate disaggregated sector for the electronics industry has been 
created in order to pinpoint and test the importance of this sector for the 
Taiwanese economy. The dualistic breakdown of activities has not been 
pursued for Taiwan. The reason for this is that we are solely interested in 
sectors which are primarily modern R&D intensive. We also focus exclusively 
on the high technology sectors within manufacturing. Thus the range of 
analysis is narrower for Taiwan than for South Korea. But future extensions 
may be possible if one is interested, for example, in agricultural technologies. 
    Table 5 below gives a complete description of endogenous 
accounts for the Taiwan SAM.   28
Table 5: SAM-Tech classification for Taiwan: 
1990 and 1992 
  1       Engineers 
  2       Technicians 
  3       Skilled workers 
  4       Apprentices 
  5       Unskilled 
  6       White collar 
  7       Self-employed  (manufacturing) 
  8       Self-employed in service 
  9       Capital 
 10       Agricultural workers 
 11-20       same as 1-10 except that they now refer to households as opposed to factors 
 21       Cereals 
 22       Other agriculture 
 23       Fishing 
 24       Processed food 
 25       Mining 
 26       Textiles  
 27       Lumber and furniture 
 28       Chemical products 
 29       Energy 
 30       Electronics (including computers) 
 31       Cement, non-metallic mineral products 
 32       Metal products 
 33       Machinery 
 34       Transport equipment 
 35       Beverages and tobacco 
 36       Other consumer products 
 37       Construction 
 38       Real Estate 
 39       Transportation and communication 
 40       Trade and banking 
 41       Education 
 42       Medical, personal and other services 
 43       Research and Development 
 
    In the above table the modern SAM-TECH (ModSAM-TECH) is 
constructed by adding R&D rows and columns according to the scheme 
identified before. Thus, a 43X43 endogenous account SAM is formed in 
Taiwan. The basis of the SAM is the updated input-output table specially 
modified for the SAM-TECH. The factors and household classification systems 
have enough detail for our purposes here; they include the most relevant 
categories for the formation of a POLIS. The focus here is on identifying   29
productivity and value added changes; but some attention always needs to be 
paid to the distributional characteristics of the innovation system. 
    As mentioned before, in line with the strategy outlined in the last 
section two successive approximations for two different scales are made.  One 
is for 1990 GDP and the second is for the increment in two years. In the latter 
case coefficients are changed in proportion to growth. In all probability,  this 
procedure embodies a conservative increasing returns assumption because of 
the particular linear approximation scheme used. 
    For Taiwan, the simple multiplier exercises indicate a somewhat 
greater effect than South Korea as found in Khan (1998).  For each one percent 
injection of R&D output in the ModSAM-TECH increases by about 3 percent. 
The modern technological system shows a range of increase varying between 
2.5 percent and 4 percent. The electronics sector also shows the expected 
increasing returns effect. It should be recognized that the assumption of excess 
capacity is significant here. If the economy is near full employment additions to 
capacity will need to be made. In fact, such additions have occurred for both 
Taiwan and South Korea. To capture the capacity building effect a series of 
projected ModSAM-TECHs for Taiwan will be necessary. It should be pointed 
out that some inflation has accompanied the growth process, although the 
anti-inflationary policies of the Central Bank of China has kept it within bounds.   
    On the distributional side, the engineers, managers, technicians, 
and in general skilled workers gain disproportionately from the POLIS effect. As 
in the case of South Korea in Khan (1998), future trade increases of Taiwan 
with other LDCs with relatively more unskilled workers may bring factor-price   30
equalization (according to the factor-price equalization theorem in standard 
trade theory) into play.  Under such circumstances skilled/unskilled 
remuneration ratio will further deteriorate for Taiwan. Thus on the distributional 
side, in Taiwan as in South Korea, for the less skilled anyway, POLIS may turn 
out to be a mixed blessing. 
  In summary, this section has considered carefully the empirical 
evidence regarding innovation in Taiwan. Signs that Taiwan is building a POLIS 
are somewhat stronger than the South Korean case. In keeping with the 
caveats of the evolutionary approach, however, we must not hasten to 
pronounce Taiwan as a mature innovating country yet. There are still 
weaknesses even in the high technology sector.  For example, inspite of the 
government’s efforts, by and large, Taiwan still follows the imitative strategy. 
There remains several open questions as to if, when and how Taiwan can 
follow an autonomous innovation strategy.  Beyond the high technology sector, 
the rest of the economy is not as well integrated as it needs to be before a 
POLIS can be self-sustaining. But clearly, more than a mere beginning has 
been made.
14 
                                                             
14  The  1998 and 1999 issues  of Asian Development Outlook Taipei, China country 
chapter also recognized the impressive achievements and outstanding problems of 
transition with respect to the high technology sector. Conversations of the author with 
leaders in R & D sector in Taiwan also pointed to some bottlenecks. In particular the 
plans for Asia Pacific Regional Operations Center (APROC), which among other 
things, are supposed to facilitate the economy鉳  transition to high technology may be 





    In this paper, I have allowed theoretically the technological aspect 
of growth in East Asia to take the next logical step beyond imitation. That is to 
say, I have tried to go beyond the study of catch-up technology and to raise the 
question of innovation processes--Schumpeterian or otherwise--in countries 
like South Korea and Taiwan.   
 
    The analysis of growth in Taiwan (that could be carried out for 
other economies in East Asia as well) here relies crucially on a number of 
emerging concepts with regards to the operation of complex production 
economies.  Our understanding of complex economic systems in particular is 
still in its infancy. Therefore, the concepts developed here and their empirical 
applications can only be provisional and tentative. 
 
    Such qualifications notwithstanding, the present approach does 
reveal that analyzing complex technological systems can be a rewarding 
exercise, even at the current crude level of our knowledge.  However, the 
already substantial literature on East Asian growth shows a schizophrenic state 
of affairs in this regard.  At the detailed institutional level of description and 
analysis complexities are often acknowledged and their implications are 
explained. With a few important exceptions, in the formal, theoretical work 
simplifying assumptions regarding technologies are made.  Such 
simplifications, it can be argued, are necessary and inevitable. It is certainly 
understandable that as theoretical economists, we want to keep our models   32
tractable. Yet, quite often we forget that such tractability is often purchased at a 
price. In the immortal words--at least among economists--of Milton Friedman, 
“there is no such thing as a free lunch.”  Forgetting this fact has led some to 
make claims about the East Asian growth process that ignore crucial and fairly 
well-known features of the East Asian economies. 
 
    The concrete results obtained so far which are summarized in the 
section on Taiwan show how the idea of a POLIS can be operationalized. 
Although this operationalization in the present instance has involved linear 
approximations to a non-linear model, future work can attempt to overcome this 
problem. The t entative interpretation of the results is that Taiwan shows a 
modest POLIS effect.  In other words, Taiwan beginning to build structures of 
innovation that could possibly prove to be self-sustaining. Whether such 
self-sustaining virtuous positive feedback loops in the innovation systems will 
become a reality is not certain, however. Much more patient work at the micro 
level on specific sectors and industries may be necessary for a definitive 
answer to the question of a sustainable POLIS. 
   
    A small beginning in this direction has been made. Attempts by 
the electronics sector in Taiwan to build an innovation-led production systems 
can not be ignored. In particular, the efforts of firms such as Tatung and ACER 
seem to be headed in the direction of creating a domestic innovation structure. 
However, the economy-wide effects are still not clearly noticeable. It will 
perhaps take some time before such effects become discernible. There are 
also financial and other problems ahead that must be solved.   33
    At the same time there are good reasons to believe that in an 
economy-wide sense also there is some movement towards a POLIS. This 
could be encouraging news. This overall effect is clearly not caused by just one 
company; there are many sectors of Taiwan’s economy using modern 
technology that are trying to innovate. Once again, lasting success can only be 
measured as time passes.  
 
    In judging the potential for lasting technological success for a 
country like Taiwan (or for any other country, for that matter) financial factors 
can not be ignored. Sudden pressures on immature financial systems called 
upon to support the building of a POLIS may lead to a shortage of funds. On the 
financial side itself, quick liberalization or lack of prudential regulation can lead 
to excess volatility affecting long-term financing of projects crucial to the 
building of a POLIS. A detailed discussion and analysis of the complex issues 
involved here are beyond the scope of this paper. However, it may be noted 
that the relatively slower pace of liberalization seems to have insulated 
Taiwan’s economy from the Asian financial crisis in 1997. More importantly, 
unlike South Korea, Taiwan can address the problems of building a POLIS 
without having to be distracted by immediate problems of insolvency and 
illiquidity of firms. 
 
    What may be happening in the Taiwan example discussed here is 
that small and medium scale firms, as well as some large firms are utilizing bold 
catch-up strategies and are using human resources to complement R&D at the 
same time.  The study of the electronics sector shows that to a great extent this   34
may be true.  Here again, it would be foolhardy to predict an ongoing sustained 
cycle of innovations.  All one can say is that in the absence of  major political 
upheavals, capital flight, or labor unrest, etc. Taiwan stands possibly the best 
chance of forming a genuine  positive feedback loop innovation system among 
all the newly industrialized economies. 
 
    On the theoretical side this paper has shown the relevance of 
creative destruction in an overall economy-wide setting. Growth depends on 
both technical progress and creation of additional capacity in response to 
changes in aggregate demand over time. Extensions of the model exploring the 
relationship between technical change, business cycles and long-run growth 
could build a bridge between short-run and the long-run. Such models would 
have great relevance for studying not just the NIEs such as Taiwan, but 
advanced economies as well.
15 
                                                             
15 Another intriguing possible implication of the theory developed here is that it undercuts a mechanical 
‘stages’ approach to economic history. In that sense it is consistent with Gerschenkron’s(1962) critique 
of Rostow, and the importance of analyzing ‘backwardness’ in a non-deterministic and historically 
nuanced manner. I am grateful to an anonymous referee for drawing this intriguing connection between 
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